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1. Introduction 
  Game theory is a branch of mathematics that deals with interactive decision making, that 
is, with situations where two or more individuals (called players) make decisions that affect each 
other.
1 Since the final outcome depends on the actions taken by all the players, it becomes 
necessary for each player to try to predict the choices of his opponents, while realizing that they 
are simultaneously trying to put themselves in his shoes to figure out what he will do.  
The birth of game theory is usually associated with the publication in 1944 of the book 
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by the mathematician John von Neumann and the 
                                                 
1 An example is a sealed-bid first-price auction, where each participant submits a bid for an object, in 
ignorance of the bids chosen by his opponents, and the object is assigned to the highest bidder who pays his own 
bid, while the others pay nothing and receive nothing. 2 
economist Oskar Morgenstern, although important results had been obtained earlier.
2  
Applications of game theory can be found in many fields, most notably biology, computer 
science, economics,
3 military science,  political science and sociology. 
  Game theory has been traditionally divided into two branches: non-cooperative and 
cooperative. Cooperative game theory deals with situations where there are institutions that make 
agreements among the players binding. In such a setting the central question becomes one of 
agreeing on a best joint course of action, where ‘best’ could have different meanings, such as 
‘acceptable to all players and coalitions of players’
4 or ‘satisfying some desirable properties’
5.  
Non-cooperative game theory, on the other hand, deals with institutional settings where binding 
agreements are not possible, whether it is because communication is impossible or because 
agreements are illegal
6 or because there is no authority that can enforce compliance
7. 
  Because of space limitations we shall deal exclusively with non-cooperative games. Our 
focus will be on the philosophical and epistemological issues that arise in non-cooperative 
                                                 
2 For a detailed historical account of the development of game theory see Aumann (1989). 
3 The Nobel prize in economics was awarded to game theorists three times: in 1994 to John C. Harsanyi, 
John F. Nash Jr. and Reinhard Selten; in 2005 to Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling and in 2007 to Leonid 
Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson.  
4 For example, the core of a co-operative game identifies a set of “best” agreements in this sense. 
5 For example, the Shapley value identifies the “best” agreement in this sense. 
6  For  example,  many  countries  have  antitrust  laws  that  forbid  agreements  among  competing  firms 
concerning prices or production.  
7 As is the case in the international arena. 3 
games, in particular on the notion of rationality and mutual recognition of rationality. We shall 
begin with simultaneous or strategic-form games and then turn to games that have a sequential 
structure (extensive-form games).  
2. Strategic-form games and common knowledge of rationality 
  A game in strategic form with ordinal payoffs consists of the following elements:  
(1) the set  {1,..., } N n =  of players;  
(2) for every player i N Î , the set  i S  of strategies (or choices) available to player i;  
(3) the set of possible outcomes O;  
(4) an outcome function  : z S O ®  that associates, with every strategy profile (specifying a 
choice for each player)  1 1 ( ,..., ) ... n n s s S S S Î = ´ ´ , the resulting outcome;  
(5) for every player i N Î , a weak total order  i ￿  on O  representing player i’s ranking of the 
outcomes.
8,9 
                                                 
8 Thus   i O O Í ´ ￿   is a binary relation on O which is connected (for all  , o o O ¢Î , either  i o o¢ ￿ , or 
i o o ¢￿ , or both) and transitive (if  1 2 2 3  and   i i o o o o ￿ ￿  then  1 3 i o o ￿ ).  The interpretation of  i o o¢ ￿  is that 
player i considers outcome o to be at least as good as outcome o¢. We denote that player i prefers outcome o  to 
outcome o¢ by o ÷
i o¢  and define it as   and not   i i o o o o ¢ ¢ ￿ ￿ . Player i is indifferent between o and o¢, denoted 
by  o ~
i o¢, if    and   i i o o o o ¢ ¢ ￿ ￿ . 
9 For example a sealed-bid first price auction with two bidders, two legal bids ($10 and $15), a tie-breaking 
rule that declares player 1 the winner and where each player values the object more than $15 and has selfish 
preferences corresponds to the following strategic-form game: N = {1,2}, S1 = S2 = {10, 15}, O = {a, b, c} (where a 
is the outcome “player 1 gets the object and pays $10”, b is the outcome “player 2 gets the object and pays $15” and 4 
  In order to simplify the representation of a game the last three elements are usually 
collapsed into a payoff function  : i S p ® ℝ, for every player i, which is a numerical function (ℝ  
denotes the set of real numbers) satisfying the following property: the strategy profile s is 
assigned a number greater than or equal to the number assigned to the strategy profile  ' s  if and 
only if player i considers the outcome resulting from s to be at least as good as the outcome 
resulting from  ' s . Formally: for every  , ' s s S Î ,  ( ) ( ') i i s s p p ³  if and only if   ( ) ( ') i z s z s ￿ .
10  
Since  i ￿  is a weak total order, if O is a finite set then such a payoff function always exists; 
furthermore, there is an infinite number of possible payoff functions that can be used to represent 
i ￿ . It is important to note that the payoffs have no meaning beyond the ordinal ranking that they 
induce on the set of strategy profiles.  
  In the case of two players, a convenient way to represent a game is by means of a table 
where each row is labeled with a strategy of player 1 and each column with a strategy of player 
2. Inside the cell that corresponds to the row labeled x and the column labeled y the pair of 
numbers  1 2 ( ( , ), ( , )) x y x y p p  is given, denoting the payoffs of player 1 and player 2, respectively. 
Table 16.1 represents a two-player game where  1 { , , } S a b c =  and  2 { , , } S d e f = . In this game, for 
example, player 1 is indifferent between  ( , ) z a e  (the outcome associated with the strategy profile 
( , ) a e ) and  ( , ) z b e ; on the other hand, he prefers  ( , ) z a e  to  ( , ) z c e .  
                                                                                                                                                             
c is the outcome “player 1 gets the object and pays $15”), z(10,10) = a, z(10,15) = b, z(15,10) = z(15,15) = c,   
a ÷1 c ÷1 b  and  b ÷2 a ~2 c. 5 
d e f
a 3 , 2 3 , 1 0 , 1
b 2 , 3 3 , 2 0 , 1






  The epistemic foundation program in game theory aims to identify, for every game, the 
strategies that might be chosen by rational and intelligent players who know the structure of the 
game and the preferences of their opponents and who recognize each other’s rationality.  The 
two central questions are thus: (1) under what circumstances is a player rational? and (2) what 
does ‘mutual recognition of rationality’ mean? The latter notion has been interpreted as common 
knowledge of rationality. Informally, something is common knowledge if everybody knows it, 
everybody knows that everybody knows it, … and so on, ad infinitum.
11 A defining characteristic 
of knowledge is truth: if a player knows E then E must be true. A more general notion is that of 
belief, which allows for the possibility of mistakes: belief of E is compatible with E being false. 
Thus a more appealing notion is that of common belief of rationality; however, in order to 
simplify the exposition, we shall restrict attention to knowledge and refer the reader to Battigalli 
and Bonanno (1999) for the analysis of common belief. The state of interactive knowledge 
among a set of players can be modeled by means of a set of states W and, for every player i N Î , 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 In the example of the previous footnote the following are possible payoff functions: p1(10,10) = 3, 
p1(15,10) = p1(15,15) = 2, p1(10,15) = 1 and p2(10,15) = 2, p2(15,10) = p2(15,15) = 1. 6 
a partition Ki of W  (thus  i K  is a binary relation on W which is reflexive, transitive and 
symmetric, that is, an equivalence relation). Given a state w W Î , we denote the cell of i’s 
partition that contains w (that is, the equivalence class of w) by  ( ) i w K . The interpretation is 
that, at state w, player i cannot distinguish between any two states in  ( ) i w K , that is - as far as 
she knows - the true state could be any of the elements in  ( ) i w K .  The collection 
{ } , , i i N N
Î W K  is called an interactive knowledge structure. A state w Î W  is thought of as a 
complete description of the world and the subsets of W, which are called events, represent 
propositions about the world.  
Knowledge pertains to propositions and a proposition is identified with the set of states 
where it is true. For every player i, we can define a knowledge operator  :2 2 i K
W W ®  (where 2
W  
denotes the set of subsets of W) as follows:  { : ( ) } i i K E E w W w = Î Í K . Thus at state w player i 
knows (the proposition represented by) event E if E is true at every state that player i considers 
possible:  i K E wÎ  (i knows E at w) if and only if  ' E w Î  (E is true at  ' w ) for every ' ( ) i w w ÎK  
(for every  ' w  that i considers  possible at w). This is illustrated in Figure 16.2 where 
{ , , , , } a b g d e W =  and the cells of the partition of a player are denoted by rounded rectangles. 
Thus, for example,  1( ) { , } b b g = K , that is, at state b  player 1 is uncertain as to whether the true 
state is b  or g.  Consider the event  { , , } E a b d = . Then  1 { , } K E a d =  and  2 { , } K E a b = , so that 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 The notion of common knowledge was introduced independently by Lewis (1969) and Aumann (1976). 7 
( ) 1 2 { } K K E a =  while  ( ) 2 1 K K E = Æ (Æ denotes the empty set)
12. Hence at state a both players 
know E ( 1 2  and  K E K E a a Î Î ) and, while player 1 knows that player 2 knows E ( 1 2 K K E a Î ), 
it is not the case that player 2 knows that player 1 knows E ( 2 1 K K E a Ï ). 
a b g d e








FIGURE 16.2  
  Given an interactive knowledge structure  { } , , i i N N
Î W K , in order to determine whether 
an event E is common knowledge at some state w we construct a new partition, called the 
common knowledge partition, as follows. Let  , ' w w ÎW. We say that  ' w  is reachable from w  if 
there is a sequence  1 2 , ,..., n w w w  in W  and a sequence of players  1 2 1 , ,..., n j j j -  in N such that 
(1)  1 w w = , (2)  ' n w w =  and (3) for every  1,..., 1 i n = - ,  1 ( )
i i j i w w + ÎK .  Let  *( ) w K  denote the 
set of states reachable from w. For example, in Figure 16.2,  *( ) { , , } a a b g = K .  The common 
knowledge partition is obtained by enclosing two states in the same cell if and only if one is 
reachable from the other. Figure 16.2 shows the common knowledge partition constructed from 
                                                 
12 From now on we shall write  ( ) 1 2 1 2  instead of   K K E K K E . 8 
the partitions of player 1 and player 2. We can now define a common knowledge operator 
:2 2 CK
W W ®  as follows:  * { : ( ) } CKE E w W w = Î Í K . In the example illustrated in Figure 
16.2,  { , , , } { , } CK a b d e d e =  and  { , , } CK a b d =Æ. Thus, if  { , , , } F a b d e =  then at state d  both 
players know F and both players know that both players know F, and so on; that is, at d  it is 
common knowledge that F has occurred. On the other hand, if  { , , } E a b d =  then, at state a  both 
players know E but E is not common knowledge (indeed we saw above that at a it is not the case 
that player 2 knows that player 1 knows E). 
Armed with a precise definition of common knowledge, we can now turn to the central 
question of what strategies can be chosen when there is common knowledge of rationality. In 
order to do this, we need to define what it means for a player to be rational. Intuitively, a player 
is rational if she chooses an action which is “best” given what she believes or knows. In order to 
make this more precise we need to introduce the notion of model of a game. Given a game G and 
an interactive knowledge structure  { } , , i i N N
Î W K  we obtain a model of G by adding, for every 
player i, a function  : i i S s W ®  that associates with every state a strategy of player i. The 
interpretation of  ( ) i i s s w =  is that, at state w, player i plays (or chooses) strategy si. We impose 
the restriction that a player always knows what strategy he is choosing, that is, the function si is 
constant on the cells of player i’s partition: if  ( ) i w w ¢ÎK  then  ( ) ( ) i i s w s w ¢ = . The addition of 
the functions si  to an interactive knowledge structure yields an interpretation of events in terms 
of propositions about what actions the players take, thereby giving content to players’ 9 
knowledge. Figure 16.3 reproduces the game of Table 16.1 and shows a model of, where 
1 1 1 ( ) , ( ) ( ) , a c s a s b s g = = =   2 2 2 ( ) ( )  and  ( ) . e f s a s b s g = = =  
d e f
a 3 , 2 3 , 1 0 , 1
b 2 , 3 3 , 2 0 , 1























  The following is a very weak definition of rationality: at a state a player is rational if it is 
not the case that he knows that his payoff would be greater if he had chosen a different strategy 
than the one he is choosing at that state. This definition can be stated formally as follows. First 
we label a player as irrational at state w if there exists a strategy  i i s S ¢Î  such that (1)  i i s s ¢ ¹ , 10 
where  ( ) i i s w s = , and (2) for every  ( ) i w w ¢ÎK ,  ( , ( ')) ( , ( ')) i i i i i i s s p s w p s w - - ¢ > , where  ( ) i s w - ¢  
denotes the strategy profile of players other than i at state w¢: 
( ) 1 1 1 ( ) ( ),..., ( ), ( ),..., ( ) i i i n s w s w s w s w s w - - + ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ =  [recall also that, by definition of model, 
( ) ( ') i i s w s w =  for every  ( ) i w w ¢ÎK ]. Secondly, we define a player to be rational at state w if 
and only if he is not irrational at w. For example, in the model illustrated in Figure 16.3 (viewed 
as a model of the game of Table 16.1), player 1 is rational at state b despite the fact that a would 
be a better choice than c there (since player 2 is choosing e), because he does not know that 
player 2 is choosing e: he is uncertain as to whether player 2 is choosing e or f and c is a best 
reply to f. On the other hand, at state g, player 2 is not rational because she knows that player 1 is 
choosing c and she would get a higher payoff by playing d. Let  i R  denote the event that player i 
is rational. For example, in the model illustrated in Figure 16.3,  { } 1 , , R a b g =  and  { } 2 , R a b = . 




=∩ . In the model illustrated in Figure 16.3, 
{ } , R a b =  and there is no state where it is common knowledge that both players are rational: 
CKR =Æ . We are now in a position to express more precisely the question “what strategy 
profiles are compatible with common knowledge or rationality?” as follows. Suppose that 
CKR wÎ  (that is, at w it is common knowledge that all players are rational): what can we say 
about the strategy profile  ( ) 1 ( ) ( ),..., ( ) n s w s w s w = ? The answer to this question we need to 
introduce the following definition. Fix a game and let  , i i i s s S ¢Î  be two strategies of player i. We 
say that  i s¢ strictly dominates  i s if  ( , ) ( , ) i i i i i i s s s s p p - - ¢ >  for every 
1 1 1 ... ... i i i i n s S S S S S - - - + Î = ´ ´ ´ ´ ´ , that is, if  i s¢ is strictly better than  i s  for player i against 11 
every possible profile of strategies of the opponents. For example, in the game of Table 16.1, 
strategy d of player 2 strictly dominates strategy f. A strategy of player i is strictly dominated if 
there is another strategy of player i that strictly dominates it.  In the game of Table 16.1, with the 
exception of strategy f of player 2, there are no other strategies of either player that are strictly 
dominated.  
  A rational player would not play a strictly dominated strategy  i s , since he can obtain a 
higher payoff by switching to a strategy that dominates it. If the other players know that he is 
rational, they know that they are in fact playing the smaller game obtained by ruling out strategy 
i s . In this smaller game there might be a player who has a strictly dominated strategy and thus, if 
rational, she will not play it. Hence this strategy can also be ruled out and the game can be 
reduced further. This procedure of elimination of strategies is called the iterated deletion of 
strictly dominated pure strategies.
13 For example, in the game of Table 16.2, deletion of the 
strictly dominated strategy f  of player 2 leads to a smaller game where strategy c of player 1 
becomes strictly dominated by a; deletion of c leads to a yet smaller game where strategy e of 
                                                 
13 The precise definition of this procedure is as follows. Given a game  { } { } , , i i i N i N G N S p
Î Î =  (where 
: i S p ® ℝ is the ordinal payoff function of player i), for every player i let 
0 1 , ,... i i S S  be the sequence of subsets of 
i S  defined recursively as follows: (1) let 
0
i i S S =  and let 
0 0
i i D S Í  be the set of strategies of player i that are strictly 
dominated in G; (2) for  1 m ³  let 
1 1 \
m m m
i i i S S D
- - = , where 
1 1 \
m m
i i S D
- -  denotes the complement of 
1 m
i D







-  is the set of strategies of player i that are strictly dominated in the game whose strategy sets are given by  
1 1 1
1 2 , ,...,
m m m
n S S S







ℕ ∩  (where ℕ  denotes the set of non-negative integers).  12 
player 2 becomes strictly dominated (by d); after deleting e, strategy b of player 1 becomes 
strictly dominated by a and deletion of b leaves only the strategy profile ( , ) a d .  
  One of the first and most important results in the epistemic foundations of game theory is 
the following: common knowledge of the rationality of all the players implies the play of a 
strategy profile that survives the iterated  deletion of strictly dominated pure strategies.
14  For 
example, in the game of Table 16.1, if there is common knowledge of rationality then player 1 
will play a and player 2 will play d, since ( , ) a d  is the only strategy profile that survives the 
iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. 
                                                 
14 Formally, in an arbitrary model of a game G if  CKR wÎ  then  1 ( ) ... n S S s w
¥ ¥ Î ´ ´  (where the sets  i S
¥  
are as defined in the previous footnote). The converse is also true, in the sense that if   1 ... n s S S
¥ ¥ Î ´ ´  then there is 
a  model  of  G  and  a  state  w  such  that  CKR wÎ   and  ( ). s s w =   For  more  details  on  the  history  and  various 
formulations of this result see Bonanno (2008). In particular, if one allows for cardinal - rather than ordinal - 
payoffs (see Section 3) and/or the notion of rationality is strengthened, then it may be possible to eliminate more 
strategy profiles.  13 
3. Nash equilibrium, cardinal payoffs and mixed strategies. 
There are games where no strategy is strictly dominated and, therefore, common 
knowledge of rationality is compatible with every strategy profile. An example of such a game is 
given in Table 16.4. 
c d
a 3 , 3 1 , 0






  A weaker notion than the iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies is that of Nash 
equilibrium. Given a game with ordinal payoffs  { } { } , , i i i N i N G N S p
Î Î = , a strategy profile 
( )
* * *
1,..., n s s s =  is called a Nash equilibrium if no player could obtain a higher payoff by 
unilaterally changing his choice, that is, if, for every i N Î ,  
* * * * *
1 1 1 ( ) ( ,..., , , ,..., ) i i i i i n s s s s s s p p - + ³  
for every  i i s S Î . For example, in the game illustrated in Table 16.4, ( , ) b d  is a Nash 
equilibrium, while none of the other strategy profiles is.
15  A possible interpretation of Nash 
equilibrium is in terms of a self-enforcing agreement. Recall that in non-cooperative games it is 
assumed that players cannot reach enforceable agreements and thus an agreement is viable only 
                                                 
15 For instance,  ( , ) b c  is not a Nash equilibrium because  2 2 ( , ) 1 ( , ) 2 b c b d p p = < =  and thus player 2 
would be better off by unilaterally deviating from c to d. 14 
if nobody has an individual incentive to deviate from it, assuming that the other players will 
follow it. A Nash equilibrium is precisely such an agreement.  
   The Nash equilibrium ( , ) b d  of the game of Table 16.4 has the following feature: there is 
another strategy profile, namely ( , ) a c , that gives rise to an outcome that both players strictly 
prefer to the one associated with ( , ) b d . When this is the case, we say that the Nash equilibrium 
is Pareto dominated or Pareto inefficient. This is a generic phenomenon: in “almost all” games 
Nash equilibria are Pareto dominated (see Dubey, 1986). It is worth stressing that although in the 
game of Table 16.4 the strategy profile ( , ) a c  yields a better outcome for both players than the 
Nash equilibrium, it is not a viable agreement: if player 1 expects player 2 to stick to the 
agreement by playing c, then he will gain by deviating from the agreement and playing b; 
realizing this, player 2 would want to play d, rather than the agreed-upon c. That is to say, ( , ) a c  
is not a Nash equilibrium. 
  There are games that have multiple Nash equilibria and games that have none. For 
example, if in the game of Table 16.4 one replaces the payoffs associated with ( , ) b d  with (0,2) 
then the resulting game has no Nash equilibria. Nash (1950, 1951) proved that every game with 
finite strategy stets has an equilibrium if one allows for mixed strategies. A mixed strategy for 
player i is a probability distribution over his set  i S  of “pure” strategies. The introduction of 
mixed strategies requires a theory of how players rank probabilistic outcomes or lotteries. For 15 
example, in the game of Table 16.4, suppose that player 2 uses the mixed strategy 
1 2
3 3









o o  
 
 
, where o1 is the 
outcome associated with ( , ) a c  and o2 is the outcome associated with ( , ) a d , while choosing the 




o o  
 
 
, where o3 is the outcome associated with 
( , ) b c  and o4 is the outcome associated with ( , ) b d . The Theory of Expected Utility, developed by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), provides a list of consistency-of-preferences-over-
lotteries axioms which yield the following representation theorem: there exists a numerical 
























¢ =  
 
 the individual considers L at least as good as 
L¢ if and only if  1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ... ( ) ( ) ( ) ... ( ) m m m m EU L pU o p U o EU L qU o q U o ¢ = + + ³ = + + .  ( ) EU L  is 
called the expected utility of lottery L. Such a utility function is called a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function or a cardinal utility function. In the mixed-strategy extension of a 
game the payoff of player i associated with a mixed-strategy profile is the expected utility of the 
corresponding lottery over basic outcomes.  
                                                 
16 For example, he rolls a die and if the outcome is 1 or 2 then he chooses c, otherwise he chooses d. 16 
  It is worth noting that the transition from games with ordinal payoffs to games with 
cardinal payoffs (when mixed strategies are considered) is not an innocuous one. Given a game, 
it is implicitly assumed that the game itself (that is, the sets of players, strategies, outcomes and 
the players’ rankings of the outcomes) is common knowledge among the players. Assuming 
common knowledge of ordinal rankings of the basic outcomes is far less demanding than 
assuming common knowledge of von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs. A player might be fully 
aware of his own attitude to risk (that is, his own preferences over lotteries), but will typically 
lack information about the attitude to risk of his opponents.  
4. Extensive-form games with perfect information 
  While strategic-form games represent situations where the players act simultaneously (or, 
equivalently, in ignorance of each other’s choices), extensive-form games represent situations 
where choices are made sequentially. An extensive-form game with perfect information consists 
of a finite rooted tree, an assignment of a player to each non-terminal node and a ranking of the 
set of terminal nodes for each player. The terminal nodes correspond to the possible outcomes 
and, as usual, we represent the rankings of the outcomes by using an ordinal payoff function for 
each player. Nodes that are not terminal are called decision nodes. The arrows that emanate from 
a decision node represent the possible choices for the player assigned to that node. Figure 16.5 
represents a perfect-information game with two players (ignore, for the moment, the fact that 

























  The solution concept most commonly used for this type of game is that of backward 
induction, which is the following algorithm. Start from a decision node whose immediate 
successors are all terminal nodes and select a choice at that node that maximizes the payoff of 
the player assigned to that node. Replace that decision node with the payoffs associated with the 
terminal node that follows the selected choice and repeat the procedure in the resulting smaller 
tree. When applied to the game illustrated in Figure 16.5, the backward induction procedure 
selects the choices highlighted by the double edges. The backward induction algorithm yields an 
actual play (in the game of Figure 16.5 the choice of a by player 1 followed by the choice of c by 
player 2) as well as hypothetical choices at nodes that are not reached by the actual play (for 18 
example, in the game of Figure 16.5, player 2’s hypothetical choice of e at the unreached node 
y). A common interpretation of these hypothetical choices is in terms of counterfactuals. For 
example, in the game of Figure 16.5, player 2’s choice of e is interpreted as the counterfactual 
statement “if player 2’s node y were to be reached, player 2 would choose e”. Furthermore, the 
backward induction solution is often presented as capturing the notion of common knowledge of 
rationality. For example, in the game of Figure 16.5, the reasoning would be as follows: “if node 
z is reached and player 1 is rational, then he will choose h; thus if node y is reached and player 2 
knows that player 1 is rational, then player 2 knows that player 1 would follow with h if player 2 
herself were to choose f; hence if player 2 is rational she will choose e at node y; etc.” There is an 
ongoing debate in the game theory literature as to whether this reasoning is sound [see, for 
example, Aumann (1995, 1996), Binmore (1987, 1996), Bonanno (1991), Brandenburger (2007), 
Halpern (2001), Reny (1992), Samet (1996), Stalnaker (1998)].  The reason for doubting the 
validity of this interpretation of the backward induction solution can be illustrated in the game of 
Figure 16.5. If the backward induction solution is implied by common knowledge of rationality, 
then common knowledge of rationality implies that node y will not be reached. Hence the 
hypothesis “player 2 is rational and knows that player 1 is rational”, which is used to conclude 
that player 2 would choose e at node y, will be false at node y. In particular, player 2 might 
conclude that player 1 is not rational and anticipate a choice of g by player 1 at node z, thus 
making f a better choice than e at y. In order to address these issues, once again one needs to 
have a precise definition of rationality as well as, possibly, a theory of counterfactuals.  
  A good starting point is the definition of rationality used in Section 2. That definition was 
formulated for strategic-form games and was based on the notion of model of a game, which 
associates with every state (in an interactive knowledge structure) a strategy profile. It is possible 19 
to associate with every perfect-information game a strategic-form game by using the following 
definition: a strategy for player i in a perfect-information game is a list of choices, one for each 
node assigned to player i. For example, a possible strategy for player 1 in the game of Figure 
16.5 is ( , ) a g  and a possible strategy for player 2 is ( , ) d e . A strategy profile determines a 
unique path from the root of the tree to a terminal node and thus one can associate with that 
strategy profile the payoffs of the corresponding terminal node. Figure 16.6 illustrates a perfect-
information game (whose backward induction play is  1 2 3 a a a ), its corresponding strategic form 
and a model of the strategic form.  20 
A perfect-information game:
















The corresponding strategic form:  
  
d2 a2
d1,a3 2 , 2 2 , 2
d1,d3 2 , 2 2 , 2
a1,a3 1 , 1 3 , 3
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Using the definition of rationality introduced in Section 2, we have that both players are rational 
at every state (the only strictly dominated strategy is player 1’s  1 3 a d  and, after deleting it, there 
are no other strategies that are strictly dominated). It follows that at state a there is common 
knowledge of rationality, despite the fact that the associated strategy profile is (d1a3, d2), which is 
different from the backward induction solution. The issue is whether at state a we can validly 
label player 2 as rational. At that state player 2 knows that her node y is not reached and therefore 
her payoff is not affected by her choice. Hence, she is rational in a weak sense. However, a 
stronger notion of rationality would require us to evaluate her choice of  2 d  as a plan of what she 
would actually do if her decision node were to be reached. This is a counterfactual statement at 
state a, since her node y is not reached there. Aumann (1996) proposes a notion of rationality, 
which he calls substantive rationality, and shows that common knowledge of substantive 
rationality implies the backward induction play (but not necessarily the backward induction 
strategy profile). While accepting the correctness of this result within the  framework adopted by 
Aumann,  Stalnaker (1998, p.48) disputes its validity, arguing as follows: 
«Player 2 has the following initial belief: player 1 would choose a3 on her second move 
if she had a second move. This is a causal ‘if’ – an ‘if’ used to express 2’s opinion 
about 1’s disposition to act in a situation that they both know will not arise. Player 2 
knows that since player 1 is rational, if she somehow found herself at her second node, 
she would choose a3 . But to ask what player 2 would believe about player 1 if he 
learned that he was wrong about 1’s first choice is to ask a completely different 
question – this ‘if’ is epistemic; it concerns player 2’s belief revision policies, and not 
player 1’s disposition to be rational. No assumption about player 1’s substantive 
rationality, or about player 2’s knowledge of her substantive rationality, can imply that 
player 2 should be disposed to maintain his belief that player 1 will act rationally on her 
second move even were he to learn that she acted irrationally on her first.» 
  In order to be able to carry out a rigorous analysis of the implications of common 
knowledge of rationality in perfect-information games, we need to move away from the type of 22 
models that we have considered so far. The reason for this is that the association of a strategy 
profile with every state gives rise (implicitly) to two types of counterfactuals: (1) an objective 
statement about what the relevant player would do at a node that is not reached and (2) (with the 
help of the partitions) a subjective statement about what a player believes would happen if he 
were to take a different action from the one he is actually taking. The two can be disentangled by 
(1) associating, with every state, not a strategy profile but a play and (2) adding a set of relations 
that can be used to obtain a formal interpretation of counterfactual statements. We start from the 
latter. For every state w W Î  let  w P  be a “proximity-to-w ”  binary relation on W  and, for every 
w W ¢Î  let  ( ) { : } x x w w w W w ¢ ¢ = Î P P . The interpretation of  ( ) or  w w b a a b ÎP P  is that state a is 
closer to state w than b is, so that  ( ) w a P  is the set of states that are not as close to w as a  is. We 
assume that the closest state to w is w itself and, for simplicity, that  w P  is a strict ordering of W.
17 
The truth of the counterfactual “if f were the case then y  would be the case” at state w is then 
determined as follows: look for the closest state to w at which f is true, call it w¢; if y is true at 
w¢ then the counterfactual is true at w, otherwise it is false. Intuitively, closeness is interpreted 
as similarity: the closest state to w where f is true is interpreted as the most similar state to w 
among the ones where f is true. This theory of counterfactuals is due to Stalnaker (1968) and 
was later generalized by Lewis (1973).  
                                                 
17 That is,  w P  satisfies the following properties: (1)  ( ), for all  \{ } w w w w W w ¢ ¢ Î Î P  (centeredness), (2) 
for every  ,  with  a b W a b Î ¹ , either  ( ) or  ( ) w w a b b a Î Î P P  (connectedness), (3) for every  , , a b W Î  23 
  We can use proximity orderings and counterfactuals to model strategies as well as 
hypothetical beliefs, by modifying our earlier definition of a model of a perfect information 
game as follows: (1) we replace the n function  i : i S s W ®  with a single function  : d P W ® , 
where P is the set of plays of the game, and (2) we add a set of proximity relations { } w w W Î P , one 
for each state.  Thus, with every state, we associate a play rather than a strategy profile and, for 
each state, we give a proximity ranking of the states, with the state itself being the closest of all. 
Figure 16.7 illustrates a model of the perfect information game of Figure 16.6.  


























                                                                                                                                                             
if  ( ) then  ( ) w w b a a b Î Ï P P (asymmetry) and (4) for every  , , a b W Î  
if  ( ) then  ( ) ( ) w w w b a b a Î Í P P P (transitivity).  24 
In this model, at state a, node z of player 1 is not reached because his initial choice is  1 d . Is it 
true, however, at state a, that if node z were to be reached player 1 would play  3 d ? In order to 
answer this question we use the proximity ranking at a to find the closes state to a at which node 
z is reached. That state is g. Then we check whether at g  player 1 plays  3 d . Since at state g  
player 1 plays  3 a  rather than  3 d , the answer is negative: it is not true at state a that if node z 
were to be reached player 1 would play  3 d . The strategy profile implicitly associated with state 
a is thus ( ) 1 3 2 , d a d . In order to determine what a player would know or believe if a node which 
is not reached were to be reached, we proceed the same way: we look for the closest state where 
the node is reached and determine (using the cell of the information partition of this player that 
contains that node) the player’s state of knowledge at that node. For example, at state a player 2 
knows that player 1 is playing  1 d  and therefore knows that her node y is not reached. What 
would player 2 know if her node were to be reached? The closest state to a at which node y is 
reached is b and at b player 2 terminates the game by playing  2 d  and collecting a payoff of 1. Is 
this a rational choice for player 2? The answer depends on what player 2 believes would happen 
if she played  2 a  (if node y were to be reached). To determine this we look for the closest state to 
b at which node z is reached. It is state d. At state d  player 1 plays  3 d , giving a payoff of 0 to 
player 2. Thus player 2’s choice of  2 d  is indeed rational at state b.  This conclusion makes player 
1’s choice of  1 d  at state a rational. Furthermore, at state a player 2 is rational not only in a weak 
sense since she makes no choices at state a (because her node y is not reached) but also in the 
stronger sense that the choice that she would make if her node were to be reached (choice  2 d  at 25 
state b) is rational, given her belief in that situation (that is, at state b). Since both players are 
rational at state a and the common knowledge partition coincides with the individual partitions, 
at state a there is common knowledge of rationality, despite the fact that the play at a is not the 
backward induction play. Thus, using this analysis based on a theory of counterfactuals one can 
conclude that common knowledge of rationality does not imply the backward induction play (let 
alone the backward induction  solution, that is, the backward induction  strategy profile). 
  In the model of Figure 16.7 at state a  player 2 believes that if node z were reached then 
player 1 would choose  3 a  (since the closest state to a where node z is reached is state g and there 
player 1 chooses  3 a ); however, as we saw above, at state a it is also the case that player 2 would 
choose  2 d  if her node y were to be reached (state b), based on the belief (at state b) that if she 
chose  2 a  then player 1 would follow with  3 d  (state d). Hence what player 2 believes about 
player 1’s behavior in the hypothetical world where node z is reached changes going from state a 
(where the game ends without node y being reached) to the closest state b where y is reached. 
Stalnaker (1998, p.48, quoted above) argues that there is nothing wrong with such a change. 
Halpern (2001) shows that if one imposes the constraint that such changes in beliefs are not 
allowed, then Aumann’s result that common knowledge of substantive rationality implies the 
backward-induction play holds.  
5. Extensive-form games with imperfect information 
An extensive game is said to have imperfect information if at least one player is not fully 
informed about the choices made by other players in the past. To represent a player’s uncertainty 26 
concerning past moves, we use information sets (which play the same role as the cells of the 
information partitions considered earlier). An information set of player i contains several nodes 
in the tree where player i has available the same choices and the interpretation is that the player 
cannot tell at which of these nodes her choice is being made. Figure 16.8 illustrates an extensive 
game with imperfect information. Player 2 has two information sets, one consisting of the two 
nodes v and w and the other consisting of the single node x.
18 The interpretation of information 
set { , } v w  of player 2 is that, when choosing between actions D and E, player 2 does not know 
whether player 1 chose A or B. Player 3 is in a similar situation at information set { , } y z  
concerning the earlier choice of player 2 between F and G. 
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  As in the case of perfect-information games, we can associate with every extensive-form 
game with imperfect information a strategic form using the following definition: a strategy for 
player i is a list of choices, one for every information set of player i.
19 For example, the set of 
strategies of player 2 in the game of Figure 16.8 is  2 { , , , } S DF DG EF EG = . The solution 
concept most used in extensive games with imperfect information is that of subgame-perfect 
equilibrium, which is a generalization of the notion of backward induction used in perfect-28 
information games. A subgame is a portion of the entire game that (1) starts at a singleton 
information set {x} and includes all the successors of node x and (2) if y is a successor of x that 
belongs to information set h (of some player) then every node in h is a successor of x. For 
example, in the game of Figure 16.8, the portion of the tree that starts at node x of player 2 is a 
subgame; the only other subgame is the entire game. A subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash 
equilibrium of the entire game that satisfies the following property: for every subgame, the 
restriction of the strategy profile to that subgame is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame. For 
example, in the game of Figure 16.9, ( ) , , C DF H  is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium: it 
is a Nash equilibrium of the entire game and, furthermore, the restriction of ( ) , , C DF H  to the 
subgame that starts at node x, namely ( ) , F H , is a Nash equilibrium of that subgame. It was 
proved by Selten (1975) that if one allows for von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs and mixed 
strategies (see Section 3) then every finite extensive-form game with perfect recall
20 has at least 
one subgame-perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies. 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 This definition coincides with the earlier one in games with perfect information since in the case of 
perfect information the information sets of a player are all singletons. 
20 An extensive game has perfect recall if it satisfies the following property, for every player i: if h and g 
are two information sets of player i and there is a node in g which is a successor of a node in h, then every node in g 
comes after the same choice at h. Perfect recall implies that a player remembers his past choices as wells as what he 
knew in the past (see Bonanno, 2004). 29 
6. Games with incomplete information 
An implicit assumption in game theory is that the game is common knowledge among the 
players. The expression “incomplete information” refers to those situations where some of the 
elements of the game (e.g. the preferences of the players) are not common knowledge. In such 
situations the knowledge and beliefs of the players about the game need to be made an integral 
part of the model. Pioneering work in this direction  was done by Harsanyi (1967,1968). 
Harsanyi suggested a method for converting a situation of incomplete information into an 
extensive game with imperfect information (this is the so-called Harsanyi transformation). The 
theory of games of incomplete information has been developed for the case of von Neumann-
Morgenstern payoffs (see Section 3) and the solution concept proposed by Harsanyi is Bayes-
Nash equilibrium which is simply a Nash equilibrium of the imperfect information game so 
constructed. Although the traditional definition of games of incomplete information is in terms of 
types of players and of probability distributions over types
21, we shall illustrate the Harsanyi 
transformation using the epistemic structures introduced in Section 2. States can be used to 
describe possible games and thus represent the uncertainty in a player’s mind as to which game 
she is truly playing. Figure 16.9 illustrates a two-player situation of incomplete information 
using an interactive knowledge structure with the addition of a probability distribution for every 
cell of the information partition of each player. 
                                                 






























Associated with every state is a strategic-form game. Let G be the game associated with states a 
and b (it is the same game) and G¢ the game associated with state g. Fix a state, say, state a. 
Then state a describes the following situation:  
(1) both player 1 and player 2 know that the are playing game G,  
(2) player 1 knows that player 2 knows that they are playing game G,  
(3) player 2 is uncertain as to whether player 1 knows that they are playing G (which is the 
case if the actual state is a) or whether player 1 is uncertain (if the actual state is b) 
between the possibility that they are playing game G and the possibility that they are 
playing game G¢ and considers the two possibilities equally likely (that is, attaches 
probability 
1
2 to each); furthermore, player 2 attaches probability  2
3  to the first case 
(where player 1 knows that they are playing game G) and probability  1
3  to the second 
case (where player 1 is uncertain between game G and game G¢), 31 
(4) player 1 knows the state of uncertainty of player 2 concerning player 1 (as described sub 
(3) above),  
(5) it is common knowledge that each player knows his own payoffs and that player 2 also 
knows player 1’s payoffs.  
Harsanyi’s suggestion was to represent a situation of incomplete information such as the 
one illustrated in Figure 16.9 as a game with imperfect information where the initial move is 
assigned to a fictitious player, called Nature, whose role is to choose the state with 
predetermined probabilities. No payoffs are assigned to Nature and it makes no further choices.  
Information sets are then used to capture the uncertainty of the players concerning both the 
actual state and the choices made by the other players. In order for such a representation to be 
possible, it is necessary that the probabilistic beliefs of the players at the cells of their 
information partitions be consistent in the following sense: there is a probability distribution m 
over the set of states, called a common prior, which yields those probabilistic beliefs upon 
conditioning on the information represented by a cell of an information partition. Conditional 
probabilities ought to be obtained from the common prior by using Bayes’ rule. For example, in 
the situation illustrated in Figure 16.9 we want a function  :{ , , } [0,1] m a b g ®  such that  
( ) 1
( |{ , })
( ) ( ) 2
m b
m b b g





( |{ , })
( ) ( ) 3
m a
m a a b
m a m b
= =
+
 and   ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 m a m b m g + + = . 
In this case a common prior exists and is given by  2 1
4 4 ( )  and  ( ) ( ) . m a m b m g = = =  Using this 
common prior to assign probabilities to Nature’s choices we obtain the imperfect-information 
game shown in Figure 16.10. 32 









































A Nash equilibrium of this imperfect-information game is called a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of 
the corresponding incomplete-information situation. The following pure-strategy profile is Nash 
equilibrium of the game of Figure 16.10: player 1’s strategy is AB (that is, he plays A if informed 
that the state is a and plays B if informed that the state is either b or g) and player 2’s strategy is  
CD (that is, she plays C at her information set on the left and D at her information set on the 
right). To verify that this is a Nash equilibrium, we need to check that no player can increase his 
expected payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. We begin with player 1: (1) at the 
singleton information set on the left, A gives player 1 a payoff of 1 (given player 2’s choice of C) 33 
while B would give him a payoff of 0 (hence A is the optimal choice); (2) at the information set 
on the right, by Bayes’ rule player 1 must assign probability 
1
2  to node s and probability 
1
2  to 
node t; thus (given player 2’s strategy CD) choosing A would give him an expected payoff of 
1 1 1
2 2 2 1 0 + =  while B gives him an expected payoff of 
3 1 1
2 2 2 0 3 + =  (hence B is the optimal 
choice). Similarly for player 2: (1) at the information set on the left, by Bayes’ rule (given that 
player 1’s strategy is AB) player 2 must assign probability  2
3  to node u and  1
3  to node x; thus 
choosing C gives her an expected payoff of  2 1
3 3 3 0 2 + =  while D would give her an expected 
payoff of  2 1
3 3 1 1 1 + =  (hence C is the optimal choice); (2) at the information set on the right, by 
Bayes’ rule (given that player 1’s strategy is AB) player 2 must assign probability 1 to node z; 
thus choosing C would give her a payoff of 0 while D gives her a payoff of 1 (hence D is the 
optimal choice). 34 
7. Conclusion. 
There are several branches and applications of game theory that we were not able to 
discuss because of space limitations.
22 Besides co-operative game theory
23, which was 
mentioned in the introduction, we also left out evolutionary game theory
24, the theory of repeated 
games
25 and bargaining theory
26. 
In the social sciences, game theory has become pervasive not only in economics but also 
in political science
27. Of particular relevance to social science is also the game-theoretic 
approach to ethical matters and to fundamental questions of moral and political philosophy.
28 
Finally it is also worth mentioning two new developments: experimental game theory and 
neuroeconomics. The former tries to test the predictions of game theory in controlled laboratory 
                                                 
22 An excellent source of information and resources for educators and students of game theory is the web 
site  www.gametheory.net. 
23 For a recent overview of co-operative game theory see Peleg and Sudhölter (2007).  
24 Evolutionary game theory was pioneered by the biologist John Maynard Smith (1982) and has been 
extensively applied not only in biology but also in the social sciences (see Samuelson, 1998, and Weibull, 1995).  
25 For a recent account of repeated games see Mailath and Samuelson (2006). 
26 See, for example, Osborne and Rubinstein (1990). 
27 Ordeshook (1986) is a classic reference. For a more recent account see McCarty and Meirowitz (2007). 
28 See Bicchieri (2006) and Binmore (1994, 1998). 35 
settings, while the latter  aims to systematically classify and map the brain activity that correlates 
with (individual and interactive) decision-making.
29 
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